It is time to break down the technical and bureaucratic barriers that are preventing frontline American troops in Afghanistan from talking directly to U.S. intelligence analysts. This is the only valid conclusion from a string of errant airstrikes that have killed dozens of Afghan civilians and undermined the credibility of the allies in the eyes of many Afghans.

The February U.S. helicopter attack on three vehicles packed with Afghan civilians must be the last time this lesson is learned. The U.S. Air Force is now investigating the incident in Uruzgan province after the Army alleged that a U.S.-based Air Force Predator crew ignored information that the vehicles they were watching in their video feeds were not a threat. Army Kiowa helicopters delivered the lethal blow on orders from ground commanders, but in the view of the Army, the Air Force is just as culpable in the deaths of 23 civilians.

The clock is ticking in Afghanistan, and the U.S. and its allies must not wait for the outcome of the Air Force study to fix this problem. The Uruzgan incident must be a galvanizing moment. Apologizing after killing civilians does nothing to help the counterinsurgency. The allies must kill fewer civilians, and one way to do that would be to link American intelligence analysts to the troops, both U.S. and allied.

The incident in Uruzgan was a tragedy waiting to happen because of the tortured American communications architecture. During firefights, Air Force video analysts within the Distributed Common Ground/Surface intelligence network monitor feeds from the Predator aircraft. These aircraft provide the bulk of the video coverage in Afghanistan. The video analysts do not have the technology or the permission to communicate directly with Kiowa crews or anyone else in the thick of battle. Pecking away at keyboards from sites in the U.S., they send Internet chat messages to mission coordinators at Predator control centers such as the main one at Creech Air Force Base in the Nevada desert. The Predator mission coordinators decide which information to send to the battle zones.

This approach is a mistake. Intelligence analysts should be able to talk via radio satellite link with all involved to make sure their conclusions are heard and understood. As it stands now, the U.S. is playing a dangerous version of the children’s game of telephone, in which each player whispers a phrase that in the end comes out garbled. Intelligence analysts are not perfect, but incorporating them directly in the discussions could stop many mistakes. It is difficult to imagine all three Predator crew members — the pilot, sensor operator and mission coordinator — shouting down an analyst to recommend opening fire against the rules of engagement. It is easy to see how an instant message could be missed or misinterpreted.

The good news is that the U.S. has in place some of the technology to link analysts to the battlefield, and more technology is on the way. Predators already are equipped with radios that provide voice links between ground forces and Predator crews back in the U.S., using satellite communications relays. The U.S. is also rushing to fly communications antennas and computers over Afghanistan aboard high-flying Global Hawk unmanned planes. These Battlefield Communications Airborne Nodes would link ground forces to one another and to the broader network via satellite links.

Intel analysts in the U.S. could use both as pathways to talk to those in the midst of battle.

Long before the incident in Uruzgan, U.S. military leaders were engaged in internal discussions about how far forward to push the Air Force analysts. Firefights are confusing and obviously stressful events. It is understandable that Predator crews and ground commanders have been reluctant to inject more voices into the mix. It could be done, however, by defining strict rules for when analysts could speak up. To build confidence, this could be done as a pilot project, although the test would have to be concluded quickly given the urgency of the situation.

The closest to a solution achieved so far was a compromise by military leaders last year to give analysts equipment to listen to the radio chat between Predator operators and troops and commanders in the battle zones. The change has not yet been implemented but it needs to be. While that would be a step in the right direction, the analysts would not be able to enter the discussions, and for that reason this compromise would not solve the problem. Analysts still would be left to type Internet chat messages or in extreme cases contact the Predator crews by phone to urge them to heed their analyses. But it could help convince Predator crews to take the next step — adding analysts in their radios calls.

Letting the analysts in would be a bold step, and the tragedy in Uruzgan proves the time is right for boldness.

Ben Iannotta

Editor