History makes clear that the threat from improvised explosive devices is not restricted to lands far from U.S. borders. It also shows that the severity of attacks has escalated steadily. In the 1960s and ’70s, the leftist Weather Underground used homemade bombs to attack the Capitol building, Pentagon and other structures with few injuries. In 1993, Islamic terrorists detonated a truck bomb under the World Trade Center, killing six and wounding more than a thousand. Then came the horrors of the Oklahoma City bombing and the Sept. 11 attacks.

Our national leaders recognize the immediacy of the IED threat and have begun taking steps to prevent new attacks. On Feb. 12, 2007, then-President Bush approved Homeland Security Presidential Directive-19, which called on the FBI and Department of Homeland Security to lead the way toward an implementation plan for preventing IED attacks in the homeland. The Justice Department signed off on the implementation plan after it was agreed upon by all major stakeholders and shortly before the end of the Bush presidency. It is now incumbent upon our leaders to implement that plan.

As the plan recognizes, we must employ intelligence and surveillance resources in an integrated, “whole-of-government” fashion if we are to defend the homeland. The greater the emphasis on defeating an IED campaign to the “left of boom” — before an attack — the greater our chances of success. In our preparations, we must draw upon counter-IED strategies, technologies and lessons learned outside the U.S. The challenge will be to do that in a manner that is consistent with the body of law and rights of privacy that Americans hold dear.

Workable solutions will require complex operations that reach beyond individual agencies and departments and involve a diverse set of players. Mission integration, defined as the blending of technical, operational, cultural, management and policy solutions, will provide maximum impact.

Lessons from abroad will not always apply directly. Many intelligence tools used to detect IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan would, if implemented on U.S. territory, constitute government searches that would require warrants issued by criminal courts or the court established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Those FISA warrants are not as great an obstacle to law enforcement as some media reports have implied. In an emergency, a FISA warrant could be obtained in a matter of hours.

But other tools are more problematic. Coaliltion forces have used electronic countermeasures (ECMs) to stop passive-infrared, radar-triggered IEDs and remote-controlled devices. Radio-frequency flooding or operating transmitters to jam or block wireless communications could be a violation of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended. We can, however, use some electronic countermeasures domestically, but we must be focused and cautious about the signals we are blocking. For example, the signals in heart pacemakers can be vulnerable to certain ECMs. In short, defeating a domestic IED campaign will require the agencies of our government to be mindful of the legal restrictions that do not come into play in Iraq or Afghanistan.

In the information realm, post-Sept. 11 review panels criticized government agencies for employing a doctrine of “need to know” as opposed to “need to share.” Studies make clear that information sharing is not solely a technology challenge, but encompasses the need for cultural change, strong leadership, governance, privacy assurances and economic support.

Beyond culture, there is a need for a single-sign-on information system that would allow users to access appropriate information consistent with their respective levels of national security clearance. Various information sharing programs and conveyances currently exist, including but not limited to the upgraded Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system; the U.S. Joint Forces Command Knowledge Information Fusion Exchange, or KnIFE; Homeland Security’s TRIPwire intelligence data base; the FBI’S ExPERT system maintained by the agency’s Terrorist Explosives Device Analytical Center; and the Bomb Data Centers operated by the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Classified information can be conveyed via either the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System or the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network. A serious challenge remains because those in greatest need of information are often bomb technicians, most of whom do not possess national security clearances. These technicians work for the nation’s approximately 18,000 local law enforcement agencies.

In a well-coordinated multi-agency effort, functional offerings, such as new IED identification technologies, would be fully integrated for maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Counterterrorism leaders must establish effective rules across agencies to reach an understanding of governance through the integration of policy, strategy and planning. Involved agencies need to ensure alignment of resources against established plans while developing a common approach to management and budgeting. Our leaders must create incentives for agencies to collaborate and share intelligence, and technical analyses across different organizational cultures. Information technology is important and must be leveraged for maximum operational efficiency.

Next, integration with the private sector will be required because 85 percent of our national infrastructure is privately owned. There is a movement underway to include wider segments of our society in IED problem solving by creating “megacommunities” of government, civil and corporate security experts. Drawing on their natural flexibility, corporations are often able to stay on the cutting edge of technology and react more quickly to evolving challenges, thus making them agile partners in challenge resolution. They are agile partners in challenge resolution. A counter-IED megacommunity can be visualized as a triangle, with the government, civil society and corporations working together to defeat those who would cause devastation on American soil.

Without a thorough integration of efforts among agencies and the private sector, counter-IED success will likely remain elusive.

Dave Williams specialized in counterterrorism over a 30-year career at the FBI as a special agent investigator and in executive leadership roles. He is a senior associate at the Booz Allen Hamilton consulting firm in Virginia, specializing in law enforcement and counterterrorism.